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INTRODUCTION 
ILLIAM Blackstone famously proclaimed, “nothing strikes . . . 
the imagination, and affects and engages the affections of 
mankind, as the right of property.”1 Within the realm of property 
law, the same can be said about the takings power.2 This extraordi-
nary power has captured the hearts and minds of generations of 
property scholars who have sought to justify the power and eluci-
date its limitations. 
The accepted lore among academics is that the takings power is 
necessary to enable socially beneficial development projects.3 
Without the power to force private property owners to transfer 
their title to the government, many desirable projects would be un-
dermined by various holdouts. Without a mechanism like eminent 
domain, these desirable projects would grind to a halt. 
The standard justification gives rise to a formidable challenge of 
a different kind: how does society ensure that politicians do not 
abuse the takings power? As elected officials, politicians are sup-
posed to act in the best interest of the public. As individuals, how-
 
1 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 2 (Univ. of Chi. 
Press 1979) (1766). 
2 There have been many notable works in the vast literature on takings. See, e.g., 
Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 
(1985) (examining the Takings Clause in a range of contexts and in connection with 
the role of the individual and the state); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 
Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967) (analyzing the justifications for compensation in takings 
cases and proposing a fairness test).  
3 See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent 
Domain, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 101, 138–39 (2006). 
W 
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ever, they may prefer to promote their narrow self-interest rather 
than the interest of the public at large. Even well-meaning politi-
cians may often act out of mixed motives and adopt policies that 
are not optimal for their constituents. 
Consequently, the desirability of the takings power critically de-
pends on the law’s ability to negate the self-interest of politicians 
and thereby align their interests with those of the public at large. In 
this Essay, we argue that the main function of the compensation 
requirement, which has thus far eluded academic attention, is to 
provide a meaningful check on politicians’ ability to abuse the tak-
ings power. Properly designed, the compensation mandate can go a 
long way toward protecting the public from abuse of the takings 
power and ensuring that it is only used to promote the interest of 
the public at large. 
In a world without legally mandated compensation, politicians 
could exercise the takings power whenever doing so would yield 
them a personal profit, irrespective of the needs of the public at 
large. In such an environment, they could engage in various deals 
with developers that would enrich them and their partners at the 
expense of the general public. In other words, they could use the 
takings power to transfer wealth from the politically disempowered 
to the politically powerful. In this world, corruption would be ram-
pant and property rights weak. Mandatory compensation dramati-
cally reduces the profits politicians can derive from takings. As a 
result, it takes away much of the incentive to use the takings power 
to private ends and refocuses their attention on the public good. 
This line of analysis yields a new and powerful justification for 
the constitutional compensation requirement. Inspired by public 
choice theory, we argue that takings compensation is intended to 
reduce the incentives for corruption by limiting the ability of politi-
cians to profit from takings. 
As we show, our theory not only adds an additional reason for 
requiring that the government compensate owners whose property 
is taken; it also yields important insights into the optimal structure 
of takings compensation. First, we show that current incentives to 
use eminent domain excessively in the service of private developers 
cannot be blunted by modifying compensation policy. These unde-
sirable incentives can be reduced or eliminated only by a separate 
policy that involves charging developers for the benefits they re-
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ceive. Second, we show that overcompensation is even worse than 
under-compensation insofar as corruption is concerned. For this 
reason, we should look skeptically at laws requiring the payment of 
a fixed percentage bonus above market value to property con-
demnees. Additionally, market value compensation might be at-
tractive, notwithstanding its shortcomings, where judges are 
thought systematically to overrate the subjective value owners at-
tach to their properties. Third, we show why a private insurance 
system for compensating property owners for takings is not only 
impractical but undesirable, as it could also encourage political 
corruption. 
Our Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, we analyze the existing 
justifications of the compensation requirement, with particular at-
tention to those sounding in public choice. In Part II, we present 
and develop our new corruption-reducing justification for takings 
compensation and explain how it differs from preexisting justifica-
tions. In Part III, we explore the descriptive and normative impli-
cations of our corruption-reducing approach to legal policy. The 
Appendix provides a more formal model of our theory. 
I. THEORIES OF TAKINGS COMPENSATION 
The task of justifying takings compensation has preoccupied 
generations of property scholars.4 Elementary fairness seems to 
 
4 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 
59 Stan. L. Rev. 871 (2007) (offering a mechanism by which property owners could be 
fully compensated); James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit 
on Eminent Domain, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1277, 1279 (1985) (arguing for limits on the 
government’s power of eminent domain and government reimbursement for all large, 
concrete, and compensable costs resulting from takings); Daryl J. Levinson, Making 
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 345 (2000) (arguing that compensation remedies do not adequately deter 
constitutional violations by the government and other justifications for compensation 
are inadequate); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is 
Just?, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 721, 724–25 (1993) (finding that courts have been inconsis-
tent in applying the Takings Clause and identifying standards by which compensation 
should be measured); Thomas J. Miceli, Compensation for the Taking of Land Under 
Eminent Domain, 147 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 354 (1991) (proposing an 
economic model to address the moral hazard that occurs when landowners believe 
they will be undercompensated in a government takings and thus overinvest in their 
land); Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for 
Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 677, 680–81 (2005) (arguing the level of 
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demand compensating those harmed by government action.5 But 
the fact is that most government actions that harm citizens—from 
school closings to tax changes6—do not entitle the affected citizens 
to compensation. Even where the law mandates compensation, it 
often fails to pay for various harms suffered by aggrieved property 
owners.7 For example, owners who lose their property in eminent 
domain actions receive only the market value of the taken property 
even where the owner has developed a particular emotional at-
tachment that exceeds the market price.8 Understanding the justifi-
cations for takings compensation is therefore vitally important for 
deciding when and how much compensation should be paid. 
A. Fairness Justifications for Takings Compensation 
Basic fairness is the most intuitively obvious reason for demand-
ing that the state compensate owners whose property it takes. The 
Supreme Court pronounced this fairness-based justification for the 
compensation requirement in Armstrong v. United States,9 where 
the Court wrote: 
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not 
be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed 
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear pub-
lic burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.10 
 
proper compensation is directly related to how effectively the damages awards can 
fulfill the goals of the Takings Clause). 
5 Cf. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1171–72, 1235 (arguing that the correct test for 
compensation is whether it is fair). 
6 Cf. Eduardo Moisés Penalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2182, 2251 
(2004) (arguing against compensation for takings that are indistinguishable from per-
missible taxes and suggesting courts should take harm into account when determining 
whether and how much compensation should be paid). 
7 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 885–90; Lee Anne Fennell, Taking 
Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 957, 958–59 (2004); Garnett, supra 
note 3, at 106–10; James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 Mich. St. 
L. Rev. 859, 866 (2004); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell 
L. Rev. 61, 82–83 (1986). 
8 See Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988). 
9 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
10 Id. at 49. 
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Frank Michelman elaborated on this fairness justification in his 
seminal 1967 article, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law.11 Using John 
Rawls’s framework for analyzing questions of justice, Michelman 
argued that compensation should be considered fair when it repre-
sents the compensation requirement that the citizenry would have 
chosen behind a veil of ignorance. Michelman claimed that if the 
citizenry knew of a governmental power of eminent domain in the 
abstract but did not know how that power would be exercised and 
the burdens distributed among the general public, it would never-
theless have a shared sense of the ideal “fair” scope of compensa-
tion.12 Michelman argued that this shared notion of an acceptable 
risk of exposure to eminent domain and shared sense of “fair” 
compensation should serve as the baseline for judging whether 
compensation is just. It is generally believed that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York13 drew heavily from Michelman’s analysis.14 
Essentially, Michelman believed that citizens would not be will-
ing to leave their property fully vulnerable to government taking.15 
Yet Michelman also believed that citizens would feel that some risk 
of eminent domain was acceptable—that is, Michelman’s citizenry 
would accept the possibility of some takings being carried out 
without compensation.16 In addition, Michelman believed that in 
some cases, the citizenry would consent to a rule of only partial 
compensation. Less-than-full compensation would be appropriate 
where, “it could be shown that some other rule should be expected 
to work out best for each person insofar as his interests are af-
fected by the social undertakings giving rise to occasions of com-
pensation.”17 
 
11 Michelman, supra note 2. 
12 Id. at 1221–22. 
13 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
14 Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of “Investment-Backed Expectations,” 32 Urb. 
Law. 437, 437–38 (2000) (“The takings-determination phase of investment-backed ex-
pectations spans the period from its origination in a seminal 1967 article by Harvard 
law professor Frank Michelman, through its incorporation into constitutional juris-
prudence by Justice Brennan in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York . . . .”) (footnotes omitted). 
15 Michelman, supra note 2, at 1214–24. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 1221. 
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Michelman did not suffice with general remarks about shared 
senses of fair risk of eminent domain and just compensation. 
Michelman sought to sketch a quasi-utilitarian calculus for deter-
mining what the citizenry would consider a fair compensation pol-
icy. On the one hand, Michelman proposed that compensation 
ought to be paid when the gains from the government action are 
dubious, the settlement costs (that is, the costs of arranging for 
compensation) are low, and “the harm concentrated on one indi-
vidual is unusually great.”18 On the other hand, Michelman argued 
that it would be fair to deny compensation when property owners 
who are burdened by the government action also benefit from it or 
when the burden falls on the shoulders of many people.19 
The fairness justification has proved difficult to translate into 
doctrine. The imprecision of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Penn 
Central has been strongly criticized, and litigants and scholars con-
tinue to struggle over the definition of government actions that re-
quire compensation and those that do not.20 In addition, even as 
“equal treatment justification remains today the most widespread 
explanation for the compensation requirement,”21 critics like 
Nestor Davidson argue that it “has thin theoretical grounding and 
troubling doctrinal consequences.”22 
Saul Levmore offered an interesting variation on the fairness 
justification that tied it to some of the concerns of the next Section. 
Approaching the problem of political process and interest groups 
from a different direction, Levmore attempted to distinguish be-
tween compensable and non-compensable regulation by focusing 
 
18 Id. at 1223. 
19 Id. Subsequent commentators have interpreted Michelman’s analysis as suggest-
ing that government pay compensation when demoralization costs exceed settlement 
costs but not otherwise. Interestingly, this does not appear explicitly in Michelman’s 
article. See David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property Takings 35–36 (2002). 
20 The debate is generally phrased as identifying the difference between a govern-
ment action that constitutes a taking—either a regulatory taking or a physical tak-
ing—and one that does not constitute a taking. For a collection of some of the many 
articles criticizing the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence, see Abra-
ham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 Va. L. Rev. 277, 284–89 
(2001). 
21 Dana & Merrill, supra note 19, at 33–34. 
22 Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 
3–4 (2008). 
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on the effects of the political process on minorities.23 Echoing the 
concern voiced in Armstrong v. United States, Levmore wrote that 
the takings power was always vulnerable to a fear that the govern-
ment might use its regulatory power to benefit strong interest 
groups.24 While Levmore argued that the strong minorities or ma-
jorities might protect themselves in the political process, disem-
powered minorities would be left without political recourse.25 Thus, 
Levmore summarized: 
A central theme of takings law is that protection is offered 
against the possibility that majorities may mistreat minorities. A 
paradigmatic case is that of a community of landowners who 
combine to expropriate the property of one landowner for their 
community’s enjoyment. Such majoritarian, or gang, law is 
thought unfair because of an equal treatment principle, which is 
especially compelling when the community’s needs would be met 
just as well by using any piece of land, or because of the realistic 
fear that the ganging up will too often be at the expense of the 
neighbor who is most different or most nonconforming.26  
Levmore took these conclusions to a quite different conclusion 
than that offered by Michelman. Rather than focusing on settle-
ment and demoralization costs of takings, Levmore suggested fo-
cusing on the size and political power of affected groups. Thus, for 
example, Levmore suggested that compensation is necessary where 
the government orders rent control schemes aimed at mobile home 
owners where there are very few mobile home parks in the jurisdic-
tion, or “price or wage controls directed at one business, rather 
than at an entire industry (or at the economy as a whole).”27 By 
contrast, wrote Levmore, “controls that do not go so far as to deny 
a minimal market rate of return and that are applied to an entire 
industry or economy are just the sort of thing that is resolved in the 
 
23 Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 285, 292–93 
(1990).  
24 Id. at 306–07, 310–11. 
25 Id. at 306–07.  
26 Id. at 309.  
27 Id. at 313. 
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political arena where most of the affected parties are repre-
sented.”28 
B. Public Choice Justifications for Takings Compensation 
Many scholars have supplemented the fairness understanding of 
takings compensation with additional theories grounded in an insti-
tutional understanding of government. In this Section, we closely 
examine the primary justifications for the compensation require-
ment of takings law offered in the public choice literature: over-
coming fiscal illusion and politically powerful condemnees. Finally, 
we examine whether there have been earlier corruption-reducing 
theories of takings compensation. 
Public choice is the branch of economic analysis that studies po-
litical problems, and, especially, the decisionmaking of the state.29 
As such, it represents a fertile ground for understanding why the 
law should mandate that the state pay compensation for its actions 
that are considered takings. 
To date, public choice theorists have advanced two primary justi-
fications for the compensation requirement. First, some scholars 
have argued that government decisionmaking is susceptible to fis-
cal illusion, namely, the claimed tendency of government deci-
sionmakers to ignore all costs that do not find expression in the 
government budget.30 The second justification advanced by some 
public choice scholars is that compensation helps ameliorate cer-
tain kinds of interest group pressures. This justification relies on 
Mancur Olson’s seminal work on the power of interest groups in 
controlling government decisionmaking.31 Olson’s work suggests 
that small, well-organized groups can influence political processes 
to capture benefits at the expense of larger but more poorly organ-
 
28 Id. 
29 See generally Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III (2003).  
30 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 881–84; Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569, 
620–22 (1984); Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 110, 131–32 (2002); see also William A. Fischel, Takings and Public Choice: 
The Persuasion of Price, in 2 The Encyclopedia of Public Choice 549 (Charles Rowley 
& Friedrich Schneider eds., 2003) (discussing how the government determines just 
compensation). 
31 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups (5th ed. 1975). 
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ized groups.32 Theories influenced by Olson have appeared in sev-
eral different variants, as presented below. 
We conclude this Section with a discussion of Richard Epstein’s 
theory of the Takings Clause and its possible connection to a rent-
minimizing theory of takings compensation.33 While Epstein’s the-
ory is not generally viewed as belonging to the public choice 
genre,34 Thomas Merrill saw Epstein’s requirement that all gov-
ernment action meet the conditions of Pareto optimality identified 
by welfare economics as an implicit endorsement of a connection 
between takings compensation and political rent-seeking.35 Ep-
stein’s theory provides a useful comparative baseline for the cor-
ruption-minimizing theory of takings compensation we advance in 
Part II. 
1. Fiscal Illusion 
Fiscal illusion is perhaps the most common economic explana-
tion of the constitutional mandate of just compensation.36 Those 
who believe in fiscal illusion believe that government actors are 
generally well-intentioned and well-informed and make good deci-
sions, but for a blind spot from which they all suffer. The blind spot 
(or fiscal illusion) concerns costs that do not directly affect gov-
ernment revenues and expenditures. Government actors operating 
under fiscal illusion are focused on the costs and benefits of gov-
ernment decisions, but only those costs and benefits that appear in 
their governmental budget. These government actors are blind to 
any costs their actions impose on private property owners save 
those that appear on the budget (such as lower tax yields or admin-
istrative costs). Scholars who believe in fiscal illusion justify the 
compensation requirement as a corrective to government actors’ 
vision problems. Constitutionally required just compensation 
 
32 See id. at 3. 
33 See Epstein, supra note 2. 
34 Epstein’s work is generally seen as based upon a Lockean conception of property 
and the state. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings: An Appreciative Retrospective, 15 
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 439, 443 (2006); William W. Fisher III, The Significance of 
Public Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1774, 1782 (1988). 
35 Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1561, 1562 (1986) (book review). We discuss the meaning of rent-seeking in Sub-
section I.B.4, infra. 
36 See generally Dana & Merrill, supra note 19, at 41–46. 
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forces the government to place in its budget the costs incurred by 
private property owners. This brings those costs into the field of vi-
sion of government actors that otherwise suffer from fiscal illusion, 
and thus prevents excessive takings. 
The fiscal illusion justification provides, at best, only a partial 
explanation for current compensation doctrine and practice. Spe-
cifically, it suffers from the two following shortcomings. First, it is 
at odds with the legally mandated compensation standard: com-
pensation at market value.37 Taken to its logical conclusion, the fis-
cal illusion justification calls for a more generous compensation 
measure than that currently employed, namely compensation at 
subjective value. These numbers are not generally identical. Many 
owners realize greater value from their property than market price. 
Oftentimes, it is precisely this greater value that led the owners to 
purchase the property and to hold it thereafter. For a variety of 
reasons explored in the literature, one should often expect a sub-
jective value that exceeds market value.38 That is, in general, we 
expect that owners of property attach a greater value to their prop-
erty than does the average person in the broader market. Since the 
fiscal illusion theory is concerned with full accounting for costs and 
benefits, the only measure that reflects the full cost of government 
projects is not payment of market value to the aggrieved owners 
but rather the payment of compensation at the owners’ subjective 
value, which reflects their true loss as a result of the coercive trans-
fer.39 Compensation at market value, in other words, leaves subjec-
tive losses out of the government budget and, therefore, invisible 
to government actors suffering from fiscal illusion.  
Second, the fiscal illusion justification, at least in its pure form, 
stands for the proposition that under no circumstances will com-
 
37 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (“In an effort . . . to find 
some practical standard, the courts early adopted, and have retained, the concept of 
market value.”); Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (“‘[J]ust compensation’ has been held to be satisfied by payment of market 
value.”). 
38 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 885–90 (finding the subjective value 
may exceed market value due to surplus subjective value, goodwill, community pre-
miums, and transaction costs); see also Krier & Serkin, supra note 7, at 866; Sympo-
sium, The Death of Poletown: the Future of Eminent Domain and Urban Develop-
ment After County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 837 (2004).  
39 For further discussion of the importance of compensation at subjective value, see 
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 872–75. 
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pensation be rendered voluntarily without the constitutional re-
quirement. After all, any time the state compensates individuals it 
adds costs to the state’s budget without adding any corresponding 
revenue. This proposition is manifestly, empirically false. The Con-
stitution does not require compensation for all regulations that 
harm private property value, but such regulations are often still ac-
companied by voluntary state-offered compensation.40 The reason 
for this is clear: political actors are anything but blind to costs 
borne by the private sector to the exclusion of government. Exces-
sive private costs translate in some degree into political costs for 
political actors, and, hence, to diminished politician utility. For this 
reason, it is also empirically false that politicians exclusively maxi-
mize budget surplus. 
2. Condemnee Interest Groups 
Focusing on property owners’ political grievances created by un-
compensated takings has led to a different group of justifications of 
the compensation requirement. We focus first on the version of this 
school found in the work of Daniel Farber.41 Farber’s model envi-
sions that socially efficient takings may be thwarted due to opposi-
tion from politically powerful property owners who can and will 
stop the government from taking their properties unless they are 
paid enough money to remove their opposition.42 Farber’s model, 
in other words, sees compensation as a type of “bribery” to ob-
streperous, self-minded property owners to quiet them and pave 
the way for socially efficient projects. In Farber’s view, the usual 
case in which such compensation is necessary involves a small 
number of affected properties to be taken, with widely spread pub-
lic benefits. The owners of the properties targeted for taking will 
comprise a well-motivated and small interest group, while the 
benefiting public will be scattered and poorly motivated (as the 
 
40 For a discussion of the many ways in which the government voluntarily grants 
benefits to individuals, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 Yale 
L.J. 547 (2001). 
41 Farber’s article does not rely solely on the public choice or rent-seeking account 
presented here; indeed, Farber acknowledged the plausibility of other economic ex-
planations for the compensation requirement. Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis 
and Just Compensation, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 125 (1992). 
42 Id. at 131–32. 
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benefits for any individual member of the public will be small).43 In 
such cases, Farber suggests that the payment of compensation is 
necessary to alleviate the de facto veto power of the powerful 
property owner interest group by paying it off.44 Compensation, in 
other words, is a bribe to pay off the powerful obstructionist mi-
nority opposition. 
Farber’s theory runs into several problems when measured up 
against the current legal regime. First, and most importantly, Far-
ber’s theory does not explain why it is necessary to mandate com-
pensation by law. If Farber is right, the constitutional compensa-
tion requirement is superfluous. There is no need to mandate 
compensation legally because the government will always choose 
to pay compensation of its own accord in order to carry out effi-
cient projects. It is interesting to note that this outcome stands in 
diametric opposition to the predictions of the fiscal illusion theory 
that assumes that the government will never pay compensation 
unless legally forced to do so. At best, in Farber’s world, the com-
pensation requirement can be seen as the government conceding in 
advance the inevitable to the politically powerful. 
Second, and relatedly, compensation at market value—the pre-
vailing compensation measure—is anomalous to Farber’s analysis. 
If, as Farber suggested, the goal of compensation is to appease po-
litically powerful homeowners, there is no reason to suppose the 
payment of market value will take care of the problem. At first 
blush, property owners will only be indifferent to the government 
action if they are reimbursed at the full subjective value they attach 
to the property. Otherwise, they will find the taking disadvanta-
geous and will be motivated to oppose the taking. But further 
analysis from a game theory viewpoint shows there is no reason for 
targeted homeowners to suffice with subjective value compensa-
tion. It is much more realistic to assume that once they understand 
their power to hold out and block the project, they will require the 
payment of the largest amount they can extract from the govern-
ment. This amount will be commensurate with the group’s political 
 
43 Id. at 130–31. 
44 Id. at 125 (“Public choice theory suggests that legislators normally offer compen-
sation to landowners whose property is taken for a project, because they would form a 
powerful lobby against the project if not ‘bought off.’”). 
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power and could range from zero to the full value of the project to 
society. 
Finally, Farber’s analysis is incapable of explaining why compen-
sation ought to be paid in all those cases in which the affected 
property owners do not wield sufficient political influence to block 
the taking. On Farber’s view, the payment of compensation in such 
cases is not only unnecessary but also a waste of resources. Far-
ber’s analysis proceeds on the assumption that all owners of taken 
properties are politically powerful, but in many cases this assump-
tion does not seem to comport with reality. 
3. Multiple Interest Groups 
Like Farber, Timothy Brennan and James Boyd focused on the 
political power of landowners as one of the central concerns in ex-
amining the likelihood that politicians will decide to take prop-
erty.45 Brennan and Boyd’s model, however, sought to make the 
analysis more comprehensive. Their model included a number of 
additional factors: it explicitly viewed politicians as self-interested 
and included the political power of members of the public seeking 
regulation (referred to as environmentalists) as well as taxpayers.46 
In addition, Brennan and Boyd addressed the incentive effects of 
compensation on landowners’ development decisions, a factor ex-
trinsic to our analysis.47 
Compensation, in Brennan and Boyd’s model, acts in a manner 
reminiscent of the Farber model. Compensation reduces land-
owner opposition to regulation. If compensation is high enough, 
landowners will even support regulation that harms land values. 
Brennan and Boyd add a peculiar observation as well: landowners 
can also be forced to pay a penalty whenever land use is regulated. 
If landowners are forced to pay a penalty tax regulation rather than 
 
45 Timothy J. Brennan & James Boyd, Political Economy and the Efficiency of 
Compensation for Takings, 24 Contemp. Econ. Pol’y 188, 190–95 (2006). 
46 Id. at 191–93. 
47 Id. at 195. For discussions of the problem that compensation may create “moral 
hazard” and incentivize over-development, see Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensa-
tion, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 29, 35 (2003); Paul Burrows, Compensation for 
Compulsory Acquisition, 67 Land Econ. 49 (1991); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen 
Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. Legal 
Stud. 749, 750 (1994). 
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getting compensation—that is, if they are kicked while they are 
down by being forced to pay a sum to the government in addition 
to losing value through regulation—they can be induced to oppose 
regulation which they would otherwise accept.48 Brennan and Boyd 
then asked how much compensation should be granted (or how 
much of a penalty assessed) in order to assure that government will 
reach socially optimal regulatory decisions. 
Brennan and Boyd’s model assumed that politicians seek at all 
times to maximize political support. In the regulatory takings puz-
zle, politicians make regulatory decisions in order to maximize the 
total political support emerging from three groups: taxpayers, envi-
ronmentalists, and landowners. Compensation, in this world, af-
fects political support from both landowners and taxpayers. Higher 
compensation reduces landowner opposition to regulation while 
increasing taxpayer opposition. Lower compensation increases 
landowner opposition but reduces taxpayer opposition. Environ-
mentalists are indifferent to compensation; in Brennan and Boyd’s 
model, the environmentalists care only about the regulation.49 
Brennan and Boyd determined that the resulting compensation 
rule should depend on the expected political power (or “clout”) of 
each of the three groups. If environmentalists and landowners have 
equal clout, no compensation should be paid. If environmentalists 
have considerably more clout, landowners should be penalized for 
regulation in order to induce them to increase anti-regulatory ef-
forts. Conversely, if landowners are much stronger than environ-
mentalists, compensation must be paid to reduce their opposition 
to regulation, as Farber observed. Full compensation, say Brennan 
and Boyd, is only necessary when the balance of clout between 
taxpayers (paying full compensation) and environmentalists would 
lead to optimal outcomes.50 In such a case, the full compensation 
neutralizes landowners and leaves politicians to maximize political 
support from environmentalists and taxpayers through optimal 
regulation. 
 
48 See Brennan & Boyd, supra note 45, at 196, 200. 
49 See id. at 190. 
50 See id. at 191, 197. 
BELL&PARCHOMOVSKY: HIDDEN FUNCTION 10/18/2010  8:49 PM 
1688 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 96:1673 
Paul Pecorino modified Brennan and Boyd’s model slightly by 
changing two assumptions.51 First, he assumed that compensation 
would always be positive.52 In other words, he disclaimed the possi-
bility that government could ever kick property owners when they 
are down by taxing victims of a taking. Second, his model assumed 
only two relevant groups—landowners and environmentalists—
each of which doubled as taxpayers.53 
Pecorino’s model, however, reached even more confusing results 
as a consequence of a number of other factors his model examined. 
Pecorino focused on regulations that are public goods but spread 
benefits in an uneven manner. In Pecorino’s model, taxpayers bear 
burdens equally in their role as taxpayers, but not in their roles as 
regulatory beneficiaries and burdenees. Finally, Pecorino’s model 
included the possibility that government might be biased (or unbi-
ased) in favor of one or the other groups, as well as the possibility 
that taxes might (or might not) distort social welfare.54 
Pecorino’s model ultimately revolves around three questions: 
what is the level of bias (if any) of the government, what is the dis-
tribution of benefits among groups in the population, and how 
much (if at all) does raising revenue through taxation involve 
deadweight loss? As one might guess, the last of these questions 
proves pivotal in the model. Where taxation creates deadweight 
loss, compensation obviously is costly and should be used only to 
the degree necessary to overcome government bias. Where bias is 
small, no compensation should be offered at all. Conversely, where 
taxation creates no deadweight loss, issues of government bias fall 
away and the optimality of compensation depends on the distribu-
tion of regulatory benefits. In essence, regulatory benefits consti-
tute partial compensation for regulatory burdens, so compensation 
should only be “full” where the burdenees of the regulation receive 
no regulatory benefit. Otherwise, compensation should be reduced 
in order not to incentivize excessive regulation. Interestingly, “full” 
 
51 Paul Pecorino, Optimal Compensation for Regulatory Takings (Univ. of Ala. 
Econ., Fin. & Legal Studies Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-04-01, 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1392927. 
52 See id. at 4, 6–7. 
53 See id. at 1, 4. 
54 Id. at 1. 
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compensation for Pecorino means compensation net of taxes,55 so 
that regulatory burdenees might be entitled to gross compensation 
in excess of losses. 
4. Rent-Seeking 
By contrast with the theories described earlier, Richard Ep-
stein’s theory of takings is not generally associated with public 
choice analysis. In his controversial and magisterial Takings, Ep-
stein argues that the Takings Clause of the Constitution embodies 
a principled view of limited government and its private property in 
which all persons have a moral claim to their property and the 
wealth that their property produces.56 Drawing on the theories of 
John Locke, Epstein posits that optimally, government should not 
only refrain from interfering in private property, but also should 
grant to private property owners their share of many kinds of bene-
fits created by government action utilizing that property. In Ep-
stein’s words, the compensation requirement “guarantee[s] a pro-
portionate distribution of the gain [created by government action] 
among all of the parties from whom the government takes private 
property.”57 This guaranty ensures that the government remains 
within its “proper” bounds and that it seizes private property by 
eminent domain (or any other kind of taking) and devotes it to 
public use only where it is truly reasonable to believe that the 
owner would consent. It also ensures that government’s powers 
strongly resemble those of private actors, which, according to Ep-
stein, is only proper for a representative government.58 
Epstein’s work also offers a controversial overarching theory of 
the proper relationship of government to private property.59 Ep-
 
55 Id. 
56 Epstein, supra note 2. 
57 Id. at 15. 
58 Id. at 12–13, 36. 
59 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 4, at 396–400 (attacking Epstein’s “libertarian-
ism”); Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regula-
tory State, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1463, 1484–91 (1996) (describing Epstein as a “radical 
anti-interventionist”); Mark Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An Essay for Cen-
trists, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1829, 1829 (1986) (book review) (“Takings is a very poorly rea-
soned book; Epstein makes no serious substantive arguments for the positions he ad-
vances.”); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 279, 279–80 (1986) (book 
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stein argues that aside from its ability to regulate or take property 
for public benefit, the government must not have powers different 
from those of private actors, and that those government powers 
must themselves be interpreted, as much as possible, to leave the 
private property owner in the situation in which she would find 
herself absent government interference. Thus, when compensating 
for takings, the government must pay the full subjective value of 
the property in the hands of its owner. In the absence of reliable 
mechanisms for determining the value, Epstein favors the payment 
of bonuses, such as a ten percent addition to market value.60 Addi-
tionally, any surplus created by government ownership must be 
shared with the owners whose property was taken. 
While Epstein grounds his theory of takings compensation in a 
philosophical theory of the proper role of government, he adds that 
it has the added benefit of eliminating rent-seeking. Epstein’s pro-
posed compensation scheme accounts for every dollar of govern-
ment wealth associated with a taking (whether acquired by the tak-
ing itself or produced by government use of the property), and 
therefore, according to Epstein, completely eliminates the possibil-
ity of rent-seeking because “there are no economic rents to seek.”61 
It is important to insert here an explanation of the term “rents.” 
Rents are non-competitive, non-market payments extracted by 
politicians in exchange for exercise of their powers.62 Public choice 
analysis sees rent-extracting activities as intrinsic to the business of 
government. In the pessimistic view of public choice scholars, gov-
ernment powers are auctioned off to the highest bidder and are 
employed toward that bidder’s desired end. Aside from the costs of 
auctioning, avoiding detection, and the like, government activity 
divides rents between interested bidders and politicians.63 While 
Epstein’s work does not offer a full-throated endorsement of pub-
lic choice theory, it certainly does worry about the possible misuse 
of government powers and politicians’ extractions of rents. In re-
viewing Epstein’s book, Thomas Merrill identified this observation 
 
review) (denouncing Takings as a “patchwork” that is “ahistorical,” is “not . . . devel-
oped,” and is not a “serious work of scholarship”). 
60 Epstein, supra note 2, at 184. 
61 Id. at 199. 
62 See generally Mueller, supra note 29, at 333–35. 
63 See Robert D. Tollison, Rent-Seeking: A Survey, 35 Kyklos 575, 575–79 (1982). 
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regarding economic rents as the central contribution of Epstein’s 
view of takings.64 To Merrill, Epstein’s basic argument is that any 
government action that possesses an element of redistribution pre-
sents an opening for rent seeking, and a broad reading of takings—
together with a compensation policy that provides all adversely af-
fected owners with subjective value plus an appropriate share of 
the surplus—closes this opening.65 Thus, according to Merrill, Ep-
stein’s book is best read as “an essay on public choice theory.”66 
If Merrill’s reading of Epstein is correct, then we share Epstein’s 
opinion that the takings compensation requirement aims at mini-
mizing rent-seeking, with the obvious difference that our frame-
work focuses on rent-extraction, as opposed to rent-seeking—a dis-
tinction we will explain presently.67 Yet, we maintain that Epstein’s 
scheme of minimizing rent seeking is both too broad and too nar-
row. 
On the one hand, dissipating the entire surplus created by gov-
ernment action in takings compensation does not guarantee opti-
mal government decisionmaking. While Benjamin Hermalin has 
argued elsewhere that compensation at the full level of societal 
surplus will induce owners to develop their properties to the opti-
mal level,68 it does not follow that the state will reach optimal deci-
sions if forced to pay out the full surplus. Indeed, full dissipation of 
social surplus and the inability to realize economic rents should 
dissuade government actors from undertaking socially beneficial 
takings. But more importantly, extraction of rents is possible even 
where the beneficiaries of every government action are known in 
advance. This is because government actors will enjoy the choice of 
engaging in projects that enrich (already identified) private prop-
erty owners or refraining from doing so. The ability of government 
actors to bestow profits on private owners at their discretion per-
mits politicians to confer those benefits for their own gain. One 
should therefore expect the surpluses to be diverted from owners 
to politicians, and the auction dynamic occasionally to lead to poli-
 
64 See Merrill, supra note 30, at 1585–87. 
65 See id. at 1577–78. 
66 Id. at 1578. 
67 See infra Part II. 
68 Benjamin E. Hermalin, An Economic Analysis of Takings, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 
64, 65–66 (1995). 
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ticians choosing projects sub-optimally to produce smaller societal 
surpluses but greater personal gain for themselves. 
On the other hand, Epstein’s formula is overly strict in demand-
ing allocation of the full measure of surplus to owners in propor-
tion to their contribution. Even if Epstein is right that pre-
committing the surplus to identifiable parties in advance of a tak-
ing guarantees that there will be no rents to seek, it is far from 
clear from a public choice perspective why Epstein’s proposed al-
location is the right one. Indeed, any pre-commitment of surplus—
whether proportionately to the affected owners as Epstein sug-
gests, or to the poorest members of society as identified by some 
index, or even to named persons like Jane Doe and John Smith—
should be enough to eliminate rent-seeking in this view. By this 
measuring stick, Epstein’s choice is arbitrary. There are other ways 
to dissipate the rents stemming from government takings and regu-
lation of private property, and there is no a priori reason to adopt 
Epstein’s solution to the problem. 
In addition to these theoretical problems with Epstein’s ap-
proach, there is a very practical obstacle to its implementation. 
Simply put, it is difficult to imagine that anyone can calculate in 
advance the surplus to be created by government action. Even af-
ter the fact, it will be difficult to disentangle the effects of various 
private and public actions and determine the magnitude of the sur-
plus. In advance of government actions, such calculations will be 
confounded by the additional element of speculation. Together, 
these practical problems suggest that it is not realistic to aim at 
eliminating rent seeking by pre-committing to distribute any socie-
tal surplus to affected property owners. 
Finally, as we shall show in Part III, if Epstein’s theory is truly to 
be understood as aiming at preventing rent-seeking, it makes a 
very serious error in endorsing the payment of fixed bonuses as 
proxy compensation for the subjective value owners attach to their 
property. Indeed, as we will show, Epstein’s proposal would in-
crease rather than decrease rent-seeking activity. 
II. A RENT-MINIMIZING MODEL OF TAKINGS COMPENSATION 
Having reviewed existing justifications for takings compensation 
and pointed out their shortcomings, in this Part we develop a new 
model for understanding the compensation requirement as a rent-
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minimizing device. Our central insight is that takings compensation 
is a powerful device for neutralizing politicians’ incentives to utilize 
the takings power corruptly in order to enrich themselves at the 
public expense. Our model demonstrates that where property 
owners lack political power, requiring that the state pay full com-
pensation at the owner’s subjective value will reduce to a minimum 
the politician’s incentive to act corruptly. We also show that where 
property owners have political power, the compensation require-
ment cannot be proved to have this salutary effect, but whether 
and how compensation affects political corruption is unknowable 
in the abstract.  
We can describe the basic intuition behind our models as fol-
lows. Where politicians seek to enrich themselves corruptly from 
exercising the takings power, they do so by identifying two groups 
of individuals ready to pay the corrupt politicians. The first group 
is private property owners willing to pay to avoid having their pri-
vate property taken. The second group is individuals willing to pay 
to have property given to them by corrupt politicians or, at least, to 
have corrupt politicians arrange to have the newly public property 
available to them. The less loss private owners suffer as a result of 
a taking, the less they will be willing to bribe politicians to forgo 
corrupt exercises of the takings power. Those wishing to obtain 
property or enjoy public property are not affected either way by 
compensation because what concerns them is only how much they 
will have to pay, not what the government must pay. 
Our account draws on the insights developed in the scholarship 
of public choice focused on rent seeking, pioneered by Gordon 
Tullock,69 and developed by James Buchanan,70 Sam Peltzman,71 
 
69 See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 
West. Econ. J. 224 (1967) (using economic modeling to show that the social costs of 
tariffs and monopolies are larger than the literature indicates). 
70 E.g., James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in Toward a Theory 
of the Rent-Seeking Society 3, 3–15 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) (shifting 
the focus of the study of rent seeking to nonmarket interactions and institutions as 
part of public choice theory). 
71 E.g., Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & 
Econ. 211, 212–13 (1976) (developing a formal model of the “optimum size of effec-
tive political coalitions set within the framework of a general model of the political 
process”). 
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Gary Becker,72 and Anne Krueger,73 among others. It owes a special 
debt to Fred McChesney’s discussion of rent extraction by means 
of law.74 In Gordon Tullock’s view, government services are func-
tionally items in commerce sold by decisionmakers to private bid-
ders.75 McChesney helpfully extended Tullock’s model by describ-
ing the threat of adverse government action—such as tax 
increases—as business threats used to extort payments.76 These 
views, it should be emphasized, are not a normative view of gov-
ernment, but rather a pessimistic description of the existing moti-
vation behind government actions, undesirable though the motiva-
tion may be. While the rent-seeking view is rightly disconcerting 
for many, the theory provides an important explanation of various 
persistent inefficiencies of government policies. More importantly, 
it provides a guideline to the threats created by improvident design 
of the authority of government institutions and, therefore, an im-
portant mode of analysis for those seeking to ensure that the state 
pursue the public good. 
We must also add that public choice analysis does not presume 
that all “payments” to government officials come in the form of 
naked bribes. Indeed, it is quite likely that in most contexts, even 
thoroughly corrupt politicians will be unable to or unwilling to take 
undisguised cash payments. Rather, corrupt politicians will seek to 
get paid indirectly. The payments may take a variety of forms, such 
as campaign contributions, business contracts with associates of the 
politician, and so forth.  
Our analysis proceeds from the observation that the govern-
ment’s power to take private property and transfer it from one 
owner to another is of considerable pecuniary value. In theory, 
there is no limit to the value of assets that may be seized and trans-
 
72 E.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Po-
litical Influence, 98 Q.J. Econ. 371 (1983) (presenting “a theory of competition among 
pressure groups for political influence”). 
73 E.g., Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 
Am. Econ. Rev. 291 (1974) (developing a model of competitive rent seeking for when 
rents originate from quantitative restrictions upon international trade). 
74 Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Politi-
cal Extortion (1997) [hereinafter McChesney, Money for Nothing]; Fred S. McChes-
ney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. 
Legal Stud. 101 (1987). 
75 See Tullock, supra note 69, at 228. 
76 McChesney, Money for Nothing, supra note 74, at 55–66. 
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ferred through the power of eminent domain. Accordingly, if the 
government were not under a legal obligation to pay compensation 
to aggrieved property owners, one can surmise that the eminent 
domain power would be used much more frequently as a means of 
extracting rents. 
We argue that takings compensation helps reduce the incentives 
for corruption by limiting the ability of politicians to extract 
“rents” from takings. Rent-seeking accounts of government focus 
on decisions motivated by rent-seeking interest groups or individu-
als who bid for government services. Politicians may derive rents 
from their takings power in one of two ways: first, they may 
threaten to take and demand payment from property owners in or-
der to abstain from taking or, second, they may “offer” their ser-
vices to property developers, allowing them to obtain coveted land 
without paying the asking price of the owner. Both possibilities are 
ubiquitous. Takings compensation, we show, reduces the first kind 
of rent extraction, without adversely affecting the second kind. 
To demonstrate the importance of the compensation require-
ment, we offer a model of a world where politicians are self-
seeking and make their decisions based on their desire to extract 
rents. Our model examines politicians’ decisions with and without 
compensation. Our model includes the ability of private parties to 
solicit and receive grants of property from the government. Our 
model shows that where property owners are politically powerless, 
a full compensation requirement is the best way to reduce corrupt 
takings. It shows as well that the compensation requirement cannot 
affect the motivations of private parties to solicit grants from the 
government or the motivations of corrupt politicians to make these 
grants; instead, these motivations must be separately dealt with by 
another body of law. Finally, our model demonstrates that where 
owners are politically powerful, all bets are off and it is impossible 
to say whether compensation reduces or increases corruption. 
Our model arrives at a very different conclusion than the interest 
group models described in the previous Part largely because we fo-
cus on ordinary physical takings, rather than regulatory takings. 
One of the distinguishing features of regulatory takings is that they 
combine givings (regulatory benefits) and takings (regulatory 
harms) in the same regulatory act. Ordinary physical takings, by 
contrast, generally do not combine givings in the same act. For in-
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stance, where a state takes a person’s home in order to build an 
army base, two separate acts impose the harm and create the bene-
fit. The taking of the home by eminent domain imposes the harm. 
The granting of the home to the army and the subsequent building 
of the army base confer the benefit (create the giving). Our model 
shows that this separation of givings and takings creates a situation 
where requiring compensation will almost always reduce rent-
extraction. 
We begin by presenting the assumptions on which our model is 
based. We then describe the findings of our model. The formal 
model itself appears in the Appendix. In the next Part, we illustrate 
some of the implications of our model. 
A. Assumptions 
We present here a model of politicians’ takings decisions with 
and without compensation. In our model, there are three types of 
actors: property owners, property developers, and politicians. 
Property owners are those in possession of assets and double as 
voters. Developers are those desiring to acquire certain assets that 
they do not own; developers also double as voters. Politicians have 
the authority under the law to take assets from property owners 
and convert them to public property that will be used to provide 
services to the public (that is, to owners and developers), or to 
transfer them to developers to serve as the developers’ private 
property. 
We emphasize that the term developers is a broad one and cov-
ers all those who enjoy the benefits of the property as a result of 
the transfer of ownership. Thus, for example, where the state takes 
the property of the owner and converts the property to a post of-
fice, the private citizens who benefit from the use of the post office 
are, in the terminology of our model, developers. 
Our model examines takings decisions property by property, on 
the assumption that there is no inherent limitation on the number 
of properties that can be taken. In our model, politicians make de-
cisions on whether to take property on the basis of the utility they 
realize from taking the particular property. Specifically, politicians 
will seek to take property any time they realize positive utility from 
the taking. 
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This way of modeling politicians’ behavior differs from the usual 
Peltzman models, in which politicians seek to maximize public sup-
port.77 Our decision to deviate from the usual assumption is sup-
ported by several reasons. First, majoritarian politics do not re-
quire that politicians obtain votes beyond the margin of victory. 
While politicians may wish some additional votes beyond the 
minimum for purposes of insurance, the number cannot be infinite. 
Indeed, providing costly services for additional votes beyond the 
minimum required for majority victory is wasteful.78 Second, public 
support is best seen as a means to an end rather than an end in it-
self. Politicians realize utility from public office as a result of public 
support, but their utility does not end there. Thus, it is more accu-
rate to view politicians as seeking to maximize utility generally, 
rather than votes. Moreover, as each political decision is discrete, 
we feel it is best to analyze the utility of each decision. 
Our model supposes that politicians’ ability to extract rents using 
the takings power is subject to three major restraints. First, elec-
tions impose a de facto restriction on politicians’ ability to transfer 
property. Excessive non-consensual takings of property may pre-
vent politicians from being reelected, thus costing them their office. 
We call this the electability restraint. This restraint is only mean-
ingful in two cases: if a politician by his actions alienates a suffi-
ciently large number of property owners by imposing a large 
enough cost on each to lead them to vote the politician out of of-
fice, or if the politician alienates a smaller group of very powerful 
developers or owners who wield sufficient political clout to con-
vince enough voters to bar the politician from being reelected. As a 
consequence of the latter case, we may essentially divide property 
into two basic kinds: clouted properties and unclouted properties. 
Clouted properties are those whose taking (or giving) induces a 
substantial political reaction. Generally, this is because the clouted 
properties are owned (or desired) by the politically influential. Un-
clouted properties are those that may be taken and given without 
inducing any significant political response. Generally, this is be-
 
77 See Peltzman, supra note 71, at 214. 
78 See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 283–95 
(1962). 
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cause the unclouted properties are owned by the politically mar-
ginalized. 
Second, our model subjects politicians to what we call the legal-
ity restraint. In our model, certain kinds of explicit rent extrac-
tions—such as the taking of bribes—are illegal and punishable. 
Politicians must therefore hide the rents to avoid prosecution, such 
as by extracting rents indirectly in the form of campaign contribu-
tions. 
Third and finally, we impose a transactional restraint on politi-
cians in our model. Arranging rents and holding auctions for rent-
seeking activity require the politicians’ investment of time, infor-
mation gathering, and administration. These transaction costs at-
tend every rent-extraction initiative. Relatedly, politicians will have 
to invest some money in identifying properties from which rents 
can be extracted. Consequently, politicians will avoid activities that 
promise rents that are too small to justify the cost of seeking them. 
In our model, politicians attempt to maximize their private re-
turns from their state powers by selling off exercises of their politi-
cal powers. Every piece of private property in the state is, at least 
theoretically, under threat of taking, and is therefore potentially 
the subject of a politician’s sale of her taking power. At any mo-
ment, politicians may threaten to use their powers and “sell” a veto 
over that power to the property owner. 
Thus, the politician’s decision to threaten to take (or actually to 
take) any given property can be expressed as an examination of 
whether the politician is likely to realize positive utility as a result 
of the threat or taking, where the positive utility consists of rents 
extracted by the politician, net of electability, legality, and transac-
tion restraints. The rents extracted by the politician will be some 
percentage (probably less than one hundred percent) of the poten-
tial loss to the owner in the event of the taking. 
B. Findings of Our Model 
1. Unclouted Properties 
In our model, corrupt politicians examine any given property for 
the possibility of earning rents. These rents can be extracted from 
two sources: owners and developers. The maximum amount of rent 
that an owner will pay is the value of avoiding an unwanted taking 
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or implementing a desired taking. That is, owners will pay some 
number up to the absolute value of the difference between the 
value they attach to the property (the subjective value to the 
owner) and the compensation they receive for the taking. Let us 
imagine that Olivia, the owner, values Blackacre at $1 million. Pe-
ter, the corrupt politician, seeks to extract rents from Olivia. If Pe-
ter threatens to take Blackacre, and no compensation is paid, 
Olivia will pay the corrupt Peter up to $1 million for a credible 
promise not to take Blackacre. If compensation is $500,000, Olivia 
will be willing to pay a rent of at most $500,000. If Peter demands 
$700,000 to forgo the taking, Olivia is better off allowing the gov-
ernment to take the property, collecting her compensation and suf-
fering the loss of $500,000, rather than paying the $700,000 bribe. If 
the compensation is $1.2 million, however, Olivia herself may have 
an opportunity to engage in corruption. She may ask the corrupt 
Peter to take the property, and promise Peter a payment of up to 
$200,000 to encourage the taking. 
The developer, meanwhile, operates under a different calculus. 
The maximum amount of rent that a developer will pay is the dif-
ference between the value of acquiring the property (through a 
government taking and transfer) and any charge assessed by the 
government for the giving. Here, imagine that David, the devel-
oper, values Blackacre at $900,000. If Peter is willing to arrange for 
the taking and transfer of Blackacre to David at no charge, David 
will willingly pay the corrupt David up to $900,000 to affect the 
taking and giving. If the law requires charging David $500,000 for 
the property, the maximum bribe David will pay goes down to 
$400,000. Any amount beyond that will deter David from engaging 
in the transaction. 
In evaluating these sources of rents, politicians must take ac-
count of two facts: first, politicians are unlikely to be able to extract 
the full amount of potential rent and, second, politicians face costs 
in extracting rents. Corrupt politicians do not act alone. Corrupt 
rent-seeking activities will almost certainly require partners. As a 
result, we can guess that it is rare that politicians will enjoy the full 
“benefit” of the potential pool for rent extraction. Rather, we 
should consider that politicians would, at best, realize in rents some 
percentage of the amount owners and developers are willing to 
pay. 
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In addition, as we described earlier,79 politicians must consider 
electability costs, as well as legality costs and transaction costs. If 
the properties are unclouted, electability costs become zero. We 
may therefore focus, in the first instance, on properties for which 
there are no such costs. 
As demonstrated in the Appendix, within these constraints, we 
can conclude that guaranteed compensation at subjective value will 
minimize the number of takings or threatened takings motivated 
by rent extraction. Quite simply, this is because the pool for owner 
bribes dries up when compensation equals subjective value. 
On the one hand, if the law sets the compensation standard 
above subjective value, politicians may profit by offering owners—
in exchange for rents—the chance to have their properties taken, 
and likewise property owners will pay politicians to take their 
property. The amount by which the compensation exceeds subjec-
tive value will constitute pure profit for the owner, which she will 
readily share with the accommodating politician. On the other 
hand, if the law sets the compensation standard below subjective 
value, politicians may profit by extorting from owners shares of the 
value of the threatened property in exchange for refraining from 
taking the property. The amount by which subjective value exceeds 
compensation constitutes pure loss for the owner, who will readily 
buy an amount lower than that loss to avoid the taking. Corre-
spondingly, property owners who fear that the government might 
take their property may bribe the government in order to block it 
from exercising its eminent domain power. 
When owners are assured of receiving full compensation, there is 
no reason for them to submit to corrupt politicians’ threats. In a 
world without compensation, the value of a politician’s threat to 
seize property is the full subjective value of the asset to the owner. 
Once the owner is guaranteed compensation, however, the value of 
the threat is greatly reduced. Indeed, if owners are guaranteed sub-
jective-value compensation any time their property is taken, they 
will be indifferent to threats of taking. As far as the owners are 
concerned, so long as guaranteed compensation truly reflects the 
value they attach to the asset, they should allow the assets to be 
 
79 See supra Section II.A. 
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taken with equanimity. The extortion threat thus becomes worth-
less. 
One of the most curious findings of our model is the fact that 
developers’ willingness to pay rents to encourage takings and sub-
sequent givings of the properties does not affect the result that 
compensation at subjective value is optimal. As highlighted in con-
troversial cases such as Kelo v. City of New London80 and Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,81 many of the properties 
taken by eminent domain are forked over to private parties.82 In 
addition, even where taken properties remain under government 
ownership, it is almost inevitable that some private parties will en-
joy greater benefit from use of the asset than they did prior to the 
taking. Consequently, even when developers are not formally part 
of the takings equation, they are an important part of the political 
decision. 
Simply stated, the results of our analysis are not changed by the 
fact that politicians may extract rents by giving property as well as 
by taking it.83 Indeed, within the constraints of our model, the abil-
ity to extract rents by givings should not be expected to alter in any 
way the utility of compensation in reducing rent-extracting activi-
ties. It is true, of course, that givings expand the possibilities for ex-
tracting rents; politicians can demand payment from givings recipi-
ents in exchange for granting them property or property amenities. 
Once givings enter the picture, a model of takings compensation 
must take account of three sets of actors: not merely politicians and 
property owners, but also potential property recipients (develop-
ers, in our shorthand). Thus, once developers enter the analysis, 
government rent extraction is no longer confined to interactions 
 
80 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (finding that there was no basis for exempting economic de-
velopment from the broad definition of “public purpose” and allowing a developer to 
acquire properties by eminent domain for the construction of a retail and residential 
complex). 
81 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (holding that the city did not abuse its discretion in 
condemning properties in order to convey the land to a private company for the crea-
tion of an industrial site that would create jobs and promote the public welfare). 
82 See Krier & Serkin, supra note 7, at 859–60. For views critical of the lax public use 
doctrine employed by courts in these cases to uphold the takings, see Epstein, supra 
note 2, at 161–81; Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Develop-
ment Takings after Kelo, 15 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 183 (2007). 
83 For a general discussion of the problems of givings, see Bell & Parchomovsky, su-
pra note 40. 
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with property owners. The government can auction off its eminent 
domain and regulatory power to developers to facilitate various 
construction projects for them. Likewise, developers can initiate 
transactions with politicians to this end. 
We include developers in our model alongside owners and poli-
ticians in the following manner: developers wish to have property 
that they do not currently own. One way of acquiring the property 
is straightforward. Developers may offer to purchase the property 
from the owners, and if they can agree on the price and terms of 
the sale, developers and owners can complete the transaction on 
their own. Alternatively, developers may attempt to utilize the 
politicians’ coercive powers. Instead of paying owners to transfer 
the property, the developers can prevail upon politicians to force 
the transfer of the property in two steps: first, by taking the prop-
erty by eminent domain and then by transferring it at less than 
market value (or even for free) to the developers. This latter 
method, of course, is ripe for rent-extraction. Before entering into 
a more precise analysis of the opportunities for corruption in a 
rent-seeking model with developers, we should emphasize again 
that a formal transfer of title to the developers is not necessary. For 
instance, when cities build stadiums for professional sports teams 
after taking properties by eminent domain, the city often retains 
title to the sports facility, while renting it to the sports team at an 
attractive price.84 Indeed, for this reason, our model is able to treat 
property that continues to be held by the state as simply a variant 
of developer-motivated takings, at least in the eyes of the corrupt 
politician. 
In our model, developers do not alter the takings compensation 
result because developers are in a very important sense irrelevant 
to the takings question. Developers are interested only in the giv-
ing; they are indifferent to the question of how the state acquires 
the property. Consequently, the existence of developers willing to 
 
84 See Philip Weinberg, Eminent Domain for Private Sports Stadiums: Fair Ball or 
Foul?, 35 Envtl. L. 311, 315 (2005) (explaining that the land needed for municipally-
financed sports stadiums is often acquired through eminent domain); see also Roger 
G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, “Build the Stadium—Create the Jobs!,” in Sports, Jobs, 
and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums 1, 7–8 (Roger G. 
Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997) (explaining that local government often pays for 
acquiring the land, most of the site preparation, and some of the stadium construction 
costs before leasing it to a sports team). 
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pay for property title or amenities affects the takings equation pri-
marily in two ways: (a) by increasing politicians’ abilities to extract 
rents from the property after the state acquires it; and (b) by alter-
ing the political costs associated with the taking. Neither effect 
should be exacerbated by a compensation requirement. Conse-
quently, a compensation requirement should generally reduce rent-
extracting activity, even in a world where givings are frequent and 
essentially unrestricted.85 
Once we treat developers separately, we can see that developers’ 
desire to obtain property in exchange for rents cannot be affected 
by takings compensation. Instead, developers will be affected 
solely by the charges assessed by the state in exchange for the giv-
ings. Where the givings charge equals the value that the developer 
attaches to the property, the politician’s ability to extract rents will 
be reduced to a minimum. Any value less than the subjective value 
the developer attaches to the property will create a greater incen-
tive for rent-motivated takings. 
2. Clouted Properties 
Until now we have presumed that there are no electability re-
straints on politicians’ takings powers. This is doubtless true in 
some cases: there are many property owners who are politically 
powerless and may be easily preyed upon by corrupt politicians. It 
is obviously not true, however, that all owners are politically pow-
erless. In some cases, the taking of a property may induce a politi-
cal backlash. This backlash imposes an additional cost on corrupt 
politicians that may deter them from taking, even where compen-
sation is lower than subjective value. 
Unfortunately, our model shows that there is no way of knowing 
what the compensation policy should be for such clouted proper-
 
85 Admittedly, were there absolute symmetry in transaction costs between property 
owners and developers, the existence of givings would eliminate the need for takings 
compensation. Property would be allocated optimally even without takings compen-
sation and givings charges: any threat to take and give the property would result in an 
auction between equally situated owners and developers and result in a win for the 
superior property holder. Brennan and Boyd reached a similar result. Brennan & 
Boyd, supra note 45, at 191 (finding that where landowners and those in favor of land 
use regulations (e.g., environmentalists) have equal political influence, the social op-
timum is reached without a need for takings compensation). But transaction costs are 
almost never symmetric, and this result is not likely to ever occur in the real world. 
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ties. In some cases, the optimal compensation might be zero, as 
that number would produce a significant enough backlash to en-
sure no rent-induced takings threats. In other cases, the optimal 
compensation might be as high as subjective value, since the politi-
cal backlash will never be enough to alter the usual rent-seeking 
calculus of the corrupt politician. 
This finding—that there is no optimal amount of compensation 
for deterring rent-motivated takings and threats when properties 
are clouted—is identical to that of Paul Pecorino as described in 
Part I.86 If there were a sound way to identify such clouted proper-
ties in advance, it might be possible to exempt them from the usual 
compensation requirements. However, it is difficult to imagine how 
such properties could be identified in advance, and it is yet more 
difficult to imagine what compensation policy the law should insti-
tute for such properties. 
3. Findings Summarized 
Takings compensation plays a vital role in deterring takings and 
takings threats motivated by corrupt politicians’ desire to extract 
rents from property owners. Where owners of property lack politi-
cal power to oppose takings, such rent-motivated takings and 
threats are most greatly reduced when owners are guaranteed 
compensation at the full subjective value of their property. Where 
owners have the political power to oppose takings, the effect of 
compensation on rent-motivated takings and threats is unpredict-
able. 
Takings compensation does not affect politicians’ rent-extracting 
activity vis-à-vis developers. Such rent-extracting activity is mini-
mized where developers are required to pay a givings charge equal 
to the value the developer attaches to the property. However, the 
willingness of corrupt politicians to take property in order to satisfy 
the desires of developers does not alter the desirability of compen-
sation at owners’ subjective value. 
 
86 See supra Subsection I.B.3. 
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III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
In this Part, we explore some of the further normative implica-
tions of our model, as well as some of the limiting assumptions. We 
have already observed that as far as rent extraction from property 
owners is concerned, the optimal measure is subjective value. Fur-
ther, we have seen that no compensation measure can effectively 
eliminate rents in interactions between politicians and developers. 
Rent seeking may only be ameliorated by a givings law that will 
impose a fair charge on developers commensurate with the gains 
they stand to receive from harnessing the government’s eminent 
domain power to advance various development projects. 
We now turn to three other sets of implications of our rent-
extraction understanding of takings compensation. First, we further 
refine our discussion about takings compensation to identify cases 
where practical reasons dictate anchoring compensation at market 
value rather than subjective value. In such cases, we show that pay-
ing compensation at a fixed bonus above market value as a proxy 
for subjective value, as suggested by some commentators, can be 
counterproductive. Second, we offer some observations about how 
to frame the kinds of government actions that should be subjected 
to required compensation. Specifically, we show that suggestions 
that government actions should be aggregated over a long period 
of time to offset compensation are potentially very harmful in a 
rent-seeking world. Third, we show why a private takings insurance 
mechanism cannot be developed in a world of rent seeking. In of-
fering this explanation, we seek to contribute to a small economic 
analysis of takings literature that explores the necessity of compen-
sation as a publicly-provided insurance for private losses created by 
the exercise of eminent domain.87 
 
87 See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An 
Economic Analysis, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569 (1984) (evaluating the arguments for and 
against compensation as a form of insurance against regulatory takings); Lawrence 
Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should 
Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. Econ. 71 (1984) (questioning whether compensation 
for eminent domain takings is efficient); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, 
Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Com-
pensation” Law, 17 J. Legal Stud. 269 (1988) (exploring noncompensation and insur-
ance models); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. 
Rev. 509 (1986) (addressing the impact of transitional government policy in connec-
tion with takings and other economic reforms). 
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After exploring these three implications, we turn to two limiting 
assumptions within our model. These limiting assumptions concern 
the inability to craft a compensation policy to limit corrupt takings 
of clouted properties, as well as the costs of a compensation system 
as a mechanism for combating corruption. 
A. Market Value Compensation and the Dangers of 
Overcompensation 
In our model, we demonstrated that optimal compensation for 
takings is the subjective value of property to the owner. It is par-
ticularly worth noting that because this optimal compensation is at 
precisely subjective value, excessive compensation can be just as 
much a problem as insufficient compensation. When compensation 
is excessive, politicians will seek to take property in order to ex-
tract rents. In such cases, the primary rent-seeking activity is no 
longer the threat of inadequately compensated takings. Rather, the 
relevant activity is extracting rents from owners interested in hav-
ing their properties taken in order to benefit from the inflated 
compensation package. In our rent-seeking model, there is no rea-
son to believe that the one activity is any more harmful or distor-
tive than the other. 
This has important implications for the proposal that payment of 
fixed bonuses in addition to market value should be used as proxies 
for subjective value. Adding such bonuses is likely to create rents, 
and some scholars have suggested paying a fixed bonus over mar-
ket value.88 Indeed, as we noted, Richard Epstein suggested offer-
ing such bonuses as a solution to rent-seeking takings.89 Addition-
ally, a number of jurisdictions have done so in the past, and 
continue to do so today. In Indiana, for example, when an owner-
occupied residence is taken, compensation must be paid at 150% of 
market value.90 Missouri grants 125% of market value for compen-
 
88 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L. 
Rev. 957, 958–59 (2004). 
89 See supra Subsection I.B.4. 
90 Ind. Code Ann. § 32-24-4.5-8(2)(A) (2006). 
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sation when a “homestead” is taken and 150% when a “heritage” 
property is taken.91 In our model, such rules are gravely mistaken. 
The dangers posed by such bonus compensation are in some 
ways even greater than those of undercompensation. As we have 
noted, one of the costs that politicians must take into account in ex-
tracting rents from properties is the cost of identifying candidates 
for takings. Under current law, in which compensation at market 
value for takings is guaranteed, politicians must identify properties 
for which such compensation is likely to be significantly less than 
subjective value, and then determine if a rent can be extracted, net 
of electability, legality, and transaction costs. Where takings are 
overcompensated, however, the politician’s task is considerably 
eased. She need no longer invest much effort in identifying proper-
ties for takings. Instead, unscrupulous owners who are interested in 
exploiting the generous compensation scheme will themselves ap-
proach the politicians and identify their properties as candidates 
for takings. 
But subjective value is not an easy standard for the law to real-
ize. While owners know how much value they attach to their con-
tinued ownership of their properties, others do not. Generally, sub-
jective value is neither observable nor readily ascertainable by 
third parties; only the aggrieved property owners know the true 
value of their property. In fact, the case law is quite explicit in ac-
knowledging that eminent domain law has compromised its goal of 
full compensation and adopted a standard of market value com-
pensation instead for purely practical reasons—that is, “[b]ecause 
of serious practical difficulties in assessing the worth an individual 
places on particular property at a given time . . . .”92 
This gives rise to a danger that courts asked to determine subjec-
tive value may overestimate or underestimate subjective value. 
Like the dangers of overcompensation and undercompensation, 
systematic errors of the courts do not result in symmetric dangers. 
 
91 Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 523.039(2)-(3) (2006). For further examples, see Daphna 
Lewinsohn-Zamir, Identifying Intense Preferences, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1391, 1408–09 
(2009). 
92 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979); see also United 
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (explaining that, for practical reasons, 
“courts early adopted, and have retained, the concept of market value” in determin-
ing takings compensation). 
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If courts are known systematically to overcompensate, even for a 
certain class of properties, unscrupulous owners will put them-
selves forward as candidates for takings. This will, again, reduce 
the corrupt politician’s cost of identifying a property to take, and 
increase the likelihood of a rent-seeking taking. 
Liquidity concerns may be particularly important in this respect. 
It must be recognized that for many owners the home constitutes 
the most important potential source of funds, but one that is highly 
illiquid. Simply put, houses are not as easy to transform into cash 
as bank accounts. If courts are not inclined to include liquidity con-
cerns in evaluating subjective value, this may lead to a serious dan-
ger of excessive takings in difficult financial times. When they ex-
perience insolvency or liquidity distress, a significant number of 
property owners will likely agree to receive less than what they 
would ordinarily consider the full subjective value when their 
property is taken, so long as they can receive the entire amount to 
be paid as quickly as possible. If courts are inclined to overestimate 
subjective value due to their ignoring liquidity distress, property 
owners who are pressed for liquidity will be able to receive a 
higher return on their property with a taking than they would in a 
voluntary market transaction. Realizing this, the government may 
auction off takings to owners with pressing liquidity needs in thin 
markets and extract rents from them in exchange for supplying 
them with liquidity. Since owners will receive a lesser amount in 
the open market—or may not be able to sell the property at all—
they may prefer to forego a portion of their subjective value sur-
plus and offer it to politicians to have their properties taken. 
In light of all these dangers of overcompensation, an argument 
can be adduced in favor of market compensation as the best proxy 
for subjective value. While it is true that in most cases payment at 
market value will undercompensate owners, so long as the differ-
ence between subjective value and market value is small, this dan-
ger should be preferred to the danger of overcompensating owners. 
Simply put, when politicians and courts cannot readily identify the 
property owners who place a high subjective value on their proper-
ties, compensation at subjective value will create a situation in 
which all property owners will misrepresent themselves as owners 
with high subjective value. When this happens, the administrative 
costs of separating the owners who truly have large surplus subjec-
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tive values from those who value their properties at close to market 
value will be significant. 
Under this state of affairs, it will make sense to compensate at 
market value for two related reasons. First, since politicians cannot 
readily identify those owners with high subjective value, they can-
not easily engage in rent extraction because they will not readily 
know which property owners to target. This means that the risk of 
rent extraction is likely to be very small in such a scenario. Second, 
the cost of screening for the owners with the high subjective value 
from the larger pool of owners is going to be significant. This 
means that the benefits derived from compensation at subjective 
value may be drowned out by the screening costs stemming from 
such a system. These two effects combine to establish a prima facie 
case for compensation at market value. 
B. Framing Rent-Seeking Transactions 
Our rent-minimization perspective also has important implica-
tions for the issue of “framing” the taking. There is an ongoing de-
bate about what actions should be taken into account when decid-
ing whether and how much to compensate. When the government 
takes away Bob’s title to property A, but in doing so also creates 
benefits for Bob’s property B, should compensation reflect only 
the effect on property A, or also on property B? What if today’s 
regulatory taking results in the elimination of ninety percent of the 
value of A, but yesterday’s government action created that same 
ninety percent due to a regulatory benefit? Should the taking be 
“framed” so as to allow the giving and taking to offset each other? 
In a thought-provoking article, Daryl Levinson addressed the 
framing problem and its relation to the government’s general prac-
tice of paying compensation for takings but not assessing charges 
for givings.93 Levinson observed potential unfairness in forcing the 
government to pay compensation for actions and regulations that 
reduce property value, even though the government does not get to 
collect a corresponding payment whenever its actions increase 
property value.94 Levinson argued that this asymmetry is problem-
 
93 Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L.J. 
1311 (2002). 
94 Id. at 1338. 
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atic because it is often prior government acts and planning that 
create much of the value the government is required to compen-
sate property owners for when it subsequently takes or regulates 
certain properties.95 Levinson therefore suggested that courts con-
sider prior government acts within the same “frame” as the gov-
ernment taking and give the government “credit” for past, value-
creating acts and regulations when considering the proper compen-
sation to be paid for a taking.96 More broadly, Levinson proposed 
that the legal system adopts a broad framing approach that will re-
duce the government’s obligation to compensate.97 
Our model demonstrates a significant danger in this proposed 
approach. Instead, our model supports a narrow framing of consti-
tutional transactions. In our model, every moment represents a 
new opportunity to engage in rent-seeking takings or threats. In-
cluding multiple government actions in the “frame” of a taking for 
purposes of measuring compensation leaves intact all the rent-
seeking opportunities for government givings, while increasing the 
rent-seeking opportunities associated with takings. Consider, for 
example, the following potential government actions that affect the 
value of a single property. In year one, politicians consider whether 
to approve a zoning variance permitting construction of multiple 
family homes in a protected wetlands area. In year fifty, politicians 
consider whether to nullify such variances in wetlands areas, and 
require that all such lands be returned to a pristine state. Under 
Levinson’s approach, if the government were to first grant the 
variance and then cancel it, no compensation should be paid for 
the value of the homes since the hand that gave was the same hand 
that took away. However, an analysis that focuses on rent-creating 
activities notes that both the giving and taking decisions are sepa-
rate opportunities to extract rents. In year one, the politician can 
extract payment from the owner in exchange for the variance. And 
in year fifty, the politician can demand payment in exchange for 
not taking the variance away. Indeed, if all takings transactions 
were framed broadly, as Levinson suggests, those who previously 
received government largesse would provide excellent targets for 
 
95 Id. at 1315. 
96 Id. at 1315–17. 
97 Id. at 1340. 
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extracting rents upon threat of taking back the previously be-
stowed largesse. 
We may explain this result differently by returning more specifi-
cally to the findings of our model. As noted previously,98 our model 
demonstrates that where the beneficiaries of givings are distinct 
from the victims of takings, there is no way to alter the compensa-
tion number so as to reduce corrupt activities associated with giv-
ings. Our model assumes that the takings and givings are disassoci-
ated because we examine physical takings, in which property is 
taken from one person and given to another. But even where the 
same person is the recipient of the giving and the victim of the tak-
ing, the disassociated approach used by our model is preferable, so 
long as the politician can disaggregate the results. This is because if 
the politician has distinct takings and givings choices to make, each 
one must be examined through its own utility calculus. Otherwise, 
the corruptions created by givings will increase. Each giving will 
provide an opportunity to extract rents while the politician creates 
a class of future victims for further rent extraction. 
C. Takings Insurance 
One way of analyzing takings compensation is through the prism 
of insurance, and our framework implicates this concept. In order 
to explain this implication, we first offer a preliminary review of 
the debate about private provision of takings insurance. In essence, 
by paying compensation to owners any time it takes their property, 
the government grants all property owners a publicly-provided in-
surance policy against the risk of future takings of their property. 
This analysis of the essence of takings compensation is at the heart 
of models offered by those such as Louis Kaplow99 as well as Law-
rence Blume, Daniel Rubinfeld, and Perry Shapiro.100 
The harm of such state-provided insurance is obvious: it creates 
a moral hazard that encourages excessive development of prop-
erty.101 So too, the benefit of such insurance, like all insurance, is 
obvious. Takings insurance spreads risk and therefore reduces dis-
 
98 See supra Section II.B. 
99 Kaplow, supra note 87. 
100 Blume, Rubinfeld & Shapiro, supra note 87. 
101 See id. 
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utilities associated with property owners’ risk aversion.102 As others 
have previously noted,103 the risk-aversion justification for takings 
compensation suffers from serious flaws. If risk aversion is indeed a 
problem, why not allow the market to provide a solution in the 
form of private insurance, rather than government insurance? 
Our rent minimization framework adds an additional argument 
against the adoption of private insurance against takings. To see 
why, it is crucial to understand that it is not only the power to take 
that enables rent extractions, but also information about the iden-
tity of the specific properties that may be taken. Once politicians 
identify the properties “to be taken,” they can sell the information 
both to the relevant homeowners and the insurance companies. 
Clearly, advance information about planned takings is valuable for 
both groups. In the case of the homeowners, information about a 
planned taking will send them to buy insurance on their homes. In 
the case of the insurance companies, the information will have the 
opposite effect, inducing the insurance company to engage in price 
discrimination or turn the homeowners away. 
In other words, the availability of a private insurance market 
against takings risk creates a new market in which rents may be ex-
tracted for takings threats. At the same time, if homeowners are 
compensated by insurance companies rather than the state, the 
salutary effects of state-provided compensation on reducing rent-
seeking activities will be lost. 
It is noteworthy that the ability of the government to trade in in-
formation about takings will exacerbate the adverse selection prob-
lem noted by William Fischel and is likely to cause the private in-
surance market against takings to unravel.104 Our analysis, 
therefore, supports retention of the current system of government 
provided insurance against takings. When the government is at 
once the taker and the insurer, it dramatically reduces its ability to 
profit from selling information about its planned action. 
 
102 Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 87, at 572. 
103 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 87, at 603. 
104 William Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics and Politics 191 (1995); 
Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 87, at 286. 
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D. Limiting Assumptions 
We conclude this Part by exploring the implications of several of 
the assumptions underlying our model. 
1. Cloutedness 
We begin with the sharp distinction our model draws between 
clouted and unclouted property. Our claim that takings compensa-
tion helps combat corruption is restricted to unclouted properties, 
that is, to properties whose taking would not arouse a significant 
political reaction. By contrast, our model is unable to predict how 
compensation would affect the motivation of corrupt politicians 
regarding clouted properties, that is, properties whose taking 
would arouse significant political reaction.105 
Does this argue for a bifurcated takings rule in which only un-
clouted properties would have the right to full compensation, while 
owners of clouted properties would have to fend for themselves 
politically? We think not, for two reasons. By definition, the inabil-
ity to set a compensation level that optimally reduces corrupt pres-
sures regarding clouted properties can provide no stronger argu-
ment for zero compensation than full compensation. Any 
compensation level set for clouted properties would necessarily be 
arbitrary, and there is no good reason to believe that it would de-
crease incentives for corruption when compared to full compensa-
tion. Moreover, the very establishment of a bifurcated system, in 
which owners would have to prove lack of clout in order to enjoy 
full compensation, would create an unhealthy incentive for owners 
to invest in proving that their properties are unclouted or in trying 
to disguise clouted properties as unclouted. These expenditures 
would necessarily be wasteful and it is difficult to imagine that they 
would be entirely successful. After all, it is difficult to imagine how 
owners could definitively prove the lack of political power associ-
ated with ownership of their property. 
2. Socially Desirable Givings 
In our analysis, corrupt politicians evaluate separately the possi-
bility of extracting rents from owners and from developers. In our 
 
105 See supra Section II.B. 
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model, the willingness of developers to pay bribes for givings of 
property will still encourage corrupt politicians to engage in rent-
motivated takings, even if compensation policy is optimal. We sug-
gest that incentives for rent-motivated givings can only be blunted 
where the state requires developers to pay a charge in the magni-
tude of the subjective value the developers attach to the property.106 
We should recognize, however, that assessing charges at the de-
veloper’s subjective value is not problem-free. If developers must 
pay the state the full value they attach to property given to them, 
they will be indifferent to the giving. Developers will no longer 
seek to pay bribes to corrupt politicians for givings. But they will 
also no longer seek any givings at all, whether motivated by cor-
ruption, or anything else. Any initiative for giving property in or-
der to improve social welfare will have to come from publicly 
minded politicians. 
Thus, if we believe that some givings are desirable, and we be-
lieve they will only come about if developers demand them, we 
should not rapidly embrace subjective-value charges. Rather, in 
setting the level of charges to be paid by the developers we must 
balance the desire to reduce corrupt givings on the one hand, with 
the need to encourage socially beneficial givings on the other. Un-
fortunately, since our model focuses on reducing corruption, it 
cannot specify the parameters for balancing good and bad givings. 
If we believe that publicly minded politicians will be good at seek-
ing out opportunities for socially beneficial givings, this need not 
trouble us excessively.  
3. Socially Desirable Takings 
Assessing subjective value charges to developers threatens to 
eliminate even socially beneficial givings. The reason for this is that 
a developer who must pay a givings charge at the full subjective 
value of the given property will be indifferent to the giving. Conse-
quently, developers will never go out of their way to encourage giv-
ings, even where the givings would benefit society at large. By con-
trast, within the parameters of our analysis, granting subjective 
value compensation to owners should not reduce socially beneficial 
takings. Subjective value compensation should make owners indif-
 
106 See supra Section II.B. 
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ferent to takings. The beneficiaries, however, will not be indiffer-
ent to the takings. As our analysis of givings shows, the beneficiar-
ies’ interest in the taking will not be affected by compensation at 
all.107 Additionally, publicly minded politicians should consider pur-
suing socially beneficial takings where they can be identified, irre-
spective of any beneficiary request. 
This entire analysis, however, is premised on an assumption of 
cost-free transfer payments. That is to say, we have presumed that 
the act of compensating owners for the value of their taken proper-
ties does not entail any additional cost to society. In general, trans-
fer payments do not, in and of themselves, affect total social wel-
fare. Rather, they simply add welfare to one party in the same 
amount as they lower it to another. But transfer payments are 
rarely costless. Arranging for the transfer of funds from one person 
to another entails potentially significant administrative costs. Once 
we include these administrative costs in the picture, we must ac-
knowledge that compensation decisions entail a balance between 
the reduction in corruption created by subjective value compensa-
tion and the costs of administering the payment of compensation to 
aggrieved owners. Corrupt rent-seeking activities are like other 
crimes. Given the costs of preventing crime, society may find it 
worthwhile to permit some crime to take place. 
On a similar note, our model assumes a fixed background legal 
approach to corruption, encapsulated in the “legality cost” a politi-
cian expects to pay for corrupt activities. In real life, such legality 
costs can be altered by decisionmakers. Law enforcement officials 
may devote greater efforts to locating and capturing criminals. 
Lawmakers may refine the definition and scope of criminal of-
fenses. The state may increase punishments and devote more re-
sources to confining criminals. Thus, decisionmakers face an addi-
tional set of tradeoffs when considering compensation policy. If 
raising funds for government action is costly and entails dead-
weight loss, decisionmakers must not only consider the costs of 
administering compensation, they must also consider the possibility 
of earning a better return on corruption-reduction by investing in 
law enforcement and similar measures. 
 
107 See infra Appendix, Proposition 3. 
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These factors limit the scope of our model in some respects. 
Nonetheless, we argue that the model provides important insight 
into the utility of the compensation requirement and its ability to 
fight rent seeking. At the very least, we can say that when deciding 
on compensation policy, lawmakers must incorporate into their 
calculus the importance of compensation in reducing corruption. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Essay, we developed a rent-minimization justification for 
takings compensation. We showed that the compensation mandate 
in the Fifth Amendment reduces the potential rents extracted and 
sought by politicians, developers, and property owners. By reduc-
ing available rents, the compensation requirement mitigates the 
danger of inefficient intervention in real property markets and 
lowers wasteful expenditures on lobbying efforts. 
We also examined the implications of our rent-minimization per-
spective for various policy issues such as optimal compensation 
awards, how to treat past government actions that affected the 
value of taken properties (an issue known in the literature as 
“framing”), and the desirability of adopting a givings law and insti-
tuting private insurance against takings. Our main findings were 
that the optimal compensation award for taken property should be 
between the market value and the subjective value to the owner. 
Another finding of our analysis was that a perfect solution that 
would fully eliminate all possible rents is unattainable in this con-
text. As for the framing issue, our rent-minimization analysis 
clearly favors narrow framing that treats each government act on a 
stand-alone basis. Our analysis also supports the adoption of a giv-
ings law as a way of further reducing rents. 
Finally, our analysis cautions against substituting government 
compensation with private insurance for takings. Although the dis-
cussion in the Essay is primarily theoretical, it has real world con-
sequences in both the United States and elsewhere. The pursuit of 
rents by politicians and government actors may dramatically desta-
bilize property regimes. This risk is especially acute in developing 
countries where private property is protected neither legally nor 
informally by norms or traditions. Our analysis teaches that the en-
actment and enforcement of a compensation requirement for tak-
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ings can help discipline corrupt politicians and ameliorate the ill-
effects of rent extraction and seeking. 
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APPENDIX: FORMAL MODEL 
Our model proposes that a politician’s utility calculus for taking 
any particular property can be represented by: 
 
Up = α|Vo – Po| + β|Vd – Pd| (1) 
 
In this equation, Up represents the gross utility that the politician 
may realize; Vo and Po the property’s value to the owner and the 
compensation paid for taking, respectively; Vd and Pd the prop-
erty’s value to the developer and the charge paid by the developer 
for the grant of the property; and coefficients α and β, where 0 < α 
< 1 and 0 < β < 1, each represent the inability of the politician to 
appropriate the full gain and/or loss to the owners and developers. 
This inability to estimate the full gain or loss is related, in large 
part, to the inability of a politician to credibly commit never to take 
a property after being bribed by an owner or never to fail to take 
property after granting it to a developer. 
The politician’s costs can be represented by: 
 
C = ci + cp + cl + ce (2) 
 
In this equation, costs are cumulative and consist of the costs of 
identifying properties to take (ci), costs of processing rent extrac-
tions (cp), costs of avoiding legal sanctions (cl), and the electability 
costs of a taking, that is, the anticipated future losses as a result of 
reduced chances of being reelected to office due to the taking 
(ce).
108  
The politician’s net utility for taking any given property can 
therefore be represented by: 
 
Up – C = α|Vo – Po| + β|Vd – Pd| – (ci + cp + cl + ce) (3) 
 
Formally, a politician will take a property when the politician’s 
utility function for taking the property, net of costs, is positive, or 
when: 
 
Up(|Vo – Po|, |Vd – Pd|) – C > 0 (4) 
 
108 Note that for unclouted properties, ce will be zero. 
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Alternatively, when the return of this function is positive, the 
politician can credibly threaten to take property without actually 
carrying out the taking. 
The utility function of extractable rents (Up) for the politician is 
a function of the rents that can be extracted from each of the origi-
nal owner, the developer (i.e., the potential recipient of the taken 
property), and the state (if the taken property remains under state 
ownership). For each of these actors, rents may only be extracted 
from net gain or loss. Thus, extractable rents from the owner are a 
function of the absolute value of the difference between value to 
the owner and compensation received (∆o = |Vo – Po|). Extractable 
rents from the developer are a function of the absolute value of the 
difference between the value to the developer and any payment 
rendered to the state for the property (∆d = |Vd – Pd|). Extractable 
rents from the state are a function of the difference between the 
value to the users of the property (the developers) and any pay-
ment the users make to the state. Thus, extractable rents may be 
considered as similar to the extractable rents from developers, 
since ultimately such rents may only be taken from users of the 
property. We presume that the state will not itself pay rents. 
We further presume that the extractable rents for each property 
(independent of costs) strictly increase as the total value to the de-
veloper and/or to the owner increase, such that ∂U / ∂∆o ≥ 0, ∂U / 
∂∆d ≥ 0, and ∂
2U / ∂∆o
2 ≥ 0, ∂2U / ∂∆d
2 ≥ 0. Our assumption here is 
based on the observation that there is no intrinsic reason why the 
politician’s rent should diminish with the value realized or lost by 
the owner/developer, but there is strong reason to believe that it 
would. Setting aside the costs identified above, readiness to pay 
rents will increase as the value realized or lost by the 
owner/developer increases. 
Potential costs in each case are represented by C, where C = ci + 
cp + cl + ce. We assume that ci, cp, and cl are independent of the 
compensation paid, such that ∂ci / ∂Po = 0, ∂cp / ∂Po = 0 and ∂cd / ∂Po 
= 0. We make no similar assumption about the electability costs of 
takings. In other words, ∂ce / ∂Po ≤ 0 and ∂ce / ∂Po ≥ 0 are both pos-
sible. 
Within these parameters, we now show that there is an optimal 
level of compensation that produces the minimum amount of rent-
induced takings and threats of takings. 
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Proposition 1: For unclouted properties, the closer the compensa-
tion approaches to subjective value, without exceeding it, the lower 
the likelihood of rent-extracting takings and rent-extracting threats.  
 
Proof: Under (4) above, politicians take when Up(|Vo – Po|, |Vd – 
Pd|) – C > 0. As we have defined the terms, for unclouted proper-
ties, the value of C should remain static with increases or decreases 
in Po, i.e., ∂C / ∂Po = 0. 
 
At Po=0, the politician will take when: 
 
αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > 0 (5) 
 
Imagine now that Po = θ, where 0 < θ < Vo. The politician will 
now take when: 
 
αVo – αθ + β|Vd – Pd| – C > 0 (6) 
  
Comparing (5) and (6), we can see that αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > αVo 
– αθ + β|Vd – Pd| – C because αθ > 0. Thus, as Po approaches Vo, the 
likelihood of the politician taking or threatening a rent-induced 
taking decreases. 
 
Proposition 2: For unclouted properties, the greater the compen-
sation exceeds subjective value, the greater the likelihood of rent-
extracting takings and rent-extracting threats. 
 
Proof: The proof is similar to that of proposition 1. 
 
Here, imagine that Po = γ, where Vo < γ. The politician will now 
take when: 
 
αγ – αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > 0 (7) 
 
By contrast, if Po = Vo, politicians will take when: 
 
β|Vd – Pd| – C > 0 (8) 
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Comparing (7) and (8), we can see that αγ – αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C 
> β|Vd – Pd| – C because α(γ –Vo) > 0. Thus, as Po exceeds Vo, the 
likelihood of the politician taking or threatening a rent-induced 
taking increases. 
 
Proposition 3: For unclouted properties, compensation at subjec-
tive value produces the minimum likelihood of rent-extracting tak-
ings and rent-extracting threats (although this likelihood need not be 
zero). 
 
Proof: Proposition 3 follows directly from propositions 1 and 2. 
 
Comparing (6) and (8), we can see that αVo – αθ + β|Vd – Pd| – C 
> β|Vd – Pd| – C, since α(Vo – θ) > 0. Similarly, comparing (7) and 
(8), we can see that αγ – αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > β|Vd – Pd| – C be-
cause α(γ –Vo) > 0. Thus, Up – C is at a minimum at Po = Vo, and 
compensation at subjective level produces the minimum number of 
rent-induced takings or threats of takings. 
The intuition behind these three propositions may be explained 
as follows. As noted above, politicians take when Up(|Vo – Po|, |Vd – 
Pd|) – C > 0, or when Up(|Vo – Po|, |Vd – Pd|) > C. By definition, when 
unclouted properties are taken, the net value of the taking to the 
owner (∆o) has no effect on the political cost to the politician of 
taking. Thus, the magnitude of Po is irrelevant to cp. Other ele-
ments of costs should not be affected by Po: none of the cost of 
identifying properties, the likelihood of legal sanctions, or the cost 
of processing rents should be affected by compensation. The value 
of C should therefore remain static with increases in Po. Similarly, 
compensation paid to the owner has no effect on the ability to real-
ize rents from the developer. The net value of the giving to the de-
veloper (∆d) is affected only by the value of the property to the de-
veloper, and the charge the developer must pay to receive the 
property. Thus, the sole determinant of the attractiveness of a tak-
ing or threatened taking to the politician is the extractable net 
value of the taking to the owner (α∆o). This value is zero when the 
owner is fully compensated for the taking (Po = Vo) and rises as the 
owner is either over-compensated or under-compensated. 
Having demonstrated that optimal compensation is set at the 
subjective value of the property to the owner, we can now show 
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that similarly, the optimal charge for giving property to developers 
should be set at the subjective value of the property to the devel-
oper. 
 
Proposition 4: For unclouted properties, the closer the givings 
charge approaches to subjective value to the developer, without ex-
ceeding it, the lower the likelihood of takings motivated by rent-
extracting givings. 
 
Proof: We begin again with (4) above, under which politicians 
take when Up(|Vo – Po|, |Vd – Pd|) – C > 0. 
 
At Pd = 0, the politician will take when: 
 
α|Vo – Po| + βVd – C > 0 (9) 
 
Imagine now that Pd = θ, where 0 < θ < Vd. The politician will 
now take when: 
 
α|Vo – Po| + βVd – βθ – C > 0 (10) 
 
Comparing (9) and (10), we can see that α|Vo – Po| + βVd – C > 
α|Vo – Po| + βVd – βθ – C because βθ > 0. Thus, as Pd approaches Vd, 
the likelihood of the politician taking or threatening a rent-induced 
taking decreases. 
It is worth observing here that givings charges are, for the most 
part, only a theoretical construct. As we have observed else-
where,109 it is possible to construct a givings law that would impose 
a “fair charge” requirement on developers. The “fair charge” re-
quirement is the givings’ analogue to the “just compensation” 
mandate in takings law. The “fair charge” requirement would force 
developers to pay for government conferrals of benefits and thus 
minimize their incentives to “buy” such services.110 
We do not need to examine the effect of givings charges in ex-
cess of subjective value to the developer. This is because a devel-
oper would never willingly accept such a giving subject to such a 
 
109 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 40. 
110 See id. at 615–17. 
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charge, and, under current circumstances, it is difficult to envision 
forced givings on such terms. However, we can show that the opti-
mal charge is at subjective value to the developer. 
 
Proposition 5: For unclouted properties, givings charges at sub-
jective value to the developer produce the minimum likelihood of 
takings motivated by rent-extracting givings (although this likeli-
hood need not be zero). 
 
Proof: The proof follows directly from the previous proposition. 
 
First, let us note when the politician will take if Pd = Vd: 
 
α|Vo – Po| – C > 0 (11) 
 
If we compare (10) and (11), we can see that α|Vo – Po| + βVd – βθ 
– C > α|Vo – Po| – C because β(Vd – θ) > 0. Thus, the minimum num-
ber of takings is reached as Pd = Vd. 
Until now, we have examined only unclouted properties. For un-
clouted properties, C is unaffected by the amount of compensation 
paid or givings charge assessed. It is therefore possible to see that 
optimal compensation at subjective value (and optimal givings 
charges at subjective value to the developer) achieve minimum 
rent-seeking takings. However, matters change when property is 
clouted. In such cases, C is affected by the compensation decision. 
Quite simply, in such cases, the quantum of compensation paid to 
the owners (or givings charge taken from the developer) affects the 
electability cost to the politician (ce). 
In such cases, without knowing the effect of compensation on 
the electability cost to the politician, it is not possible to determine 
the optimal quantity of compensation. Optimal compensation may 
be zero, some number less than subjective value, some number 
greater than subjective value, or subjective value. 
 
Proposition 6: For clouted properties, compensation at any level 
produces unpredictable effects on rent-extracting takings, and it may 
reduce or increase likelihood of rent-extracting takings and rent-
extracting threats, depending on the effects of compensation on the 
politician’s electability. 
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Proof: Once properties are clouted, the magnitude of Po be-
comes relevant to ce. Simply put, the likelihood that owners will 
seek to extract a political price from the politician will increase as 
∆o increases. The result is that the effects of compensation are un-
predictable. While compensation reduces Up as Po approaches Vo, it 
also may decrease C, depending on the magnitude of the political 
effect of compensation. If the effect on C dominates, compensation 
will increase the likelihood of rent-seeking takings. If the effect on 
Up dominates, compensation will decrease the likelihood of rent-
seeking takings. 
 
To see this, let us divide the cost function as follows: 
 
C = C’ + ce (12) 
 
Where 
 
ce = ε|Vo – Po| (13) 
 
and ε is a coefficient representing the political cost to be imposed 
on the politician as a result of the loss suffered by the owner. We 
should note that ε > 0, by assumption, but no upper bound of ε may 
be stated. It is possible that the political losses experienced by the 
politician may be greater or lesser than the value of the property to 
the owner. As a result, equation (3) above can be rewritten as fol-
lows: 
 
Up – C = α|Vo – Po| + β|Vd – Pd| – C’ – ε|Vo – Po| (14) 
 
In turn, we may say that the politician will take when: 
 
(α–ε)|Vo – Po| + β|Vd – Pd| – C’ > 0 (15) 
 
We may now return to our earlier proofs. 
 
In proof 1, we were able to prove that αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > αVo 
– αθ + β|Vd – Pd| – C because αθ > 0. However, we cannot prove that 
(α–ε)Vo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > (α–ε)Vo – (α–ε)θ + β|Vd – Pd| – C because 
it is possible that (α–ε) > 0 and that (α–ε) < 0. 
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In proof 2, we were able to prove that αγ – αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > 
β|Vd – Pd| – C because α(γ – Vo) > 0. However, we cannot prove that 
(α–ε)γ – (α–ε)Vo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > β|Vd – Pd| – C because it is possi-
ble that (α–ε) > 0 and that (α–ε) < 0. 
Our proof 3 depended on proofs 1 and 2, which is no longer 
valid, where the politician’s decision is made according to (15), 
rather than (4). Where ε > α, the likelihood of a rent-induced tak-
ing or threat may increase with compensation below subjective 
value or above subjective value. However, where α > ε, proofs 1, 2, 
and 3 still hold. 
Not knowing the magnitude of ε, it is not possible to know any-
thing about the optimal level of compensation. 
 
